The stages or levels of mindfulness are, from none to full mindfulness:

1 nose against the windscreen, fully preoccupied and compelled and presuming on what you see and experience before you. Nothing intrudes, either as disruption or imagination, to indicate there is another way and another take on life;

2 noticing that your are preoccupied and compelled and presuming in their workings and world, and occasionally noticing others aren’t, and wondering if there is an alternative.

3 noticing that you are preoccupied and compelled and presuming in their workings, and noticing your have influence on following it, and occasionally having a choice. (That choice is usually changing your environment external to yourself so that your unconscious follows like a (compliant) horse along the new external path). Noticing the noise of prejudice / preoccupation / compulsion / presumption coming from their innate and wired self, but having insufficient experience of this intrusion as to see it arriving and overriding all.

4 noticing the presence and distraction of their preoccupation and compulsion and presumption, and making the choice outside that noise (that is usually changing the world external to their self so that the unconscious follows the new external path).


Metacognition refers to seeing what it represents rather than face value and meaning. Most humans do this some of the time. This is the first iteration of metametacognition. The first shell of the Chinese doll is removed.

Metametacognition refers to seeing how these represent value, including the starting face value. The process of value itself, which leads to modelling and EsSample. The guess and clue that it’s Chinese dolls all the way to the core.


Metamotivation is completion of self, and improvement of self. As the equivalent of metacogition, which it probably uses, it is action only, and less cognitive. It’s the parallel embodied version of metacognition. It satisfies the outer or first Chinese doll, but no further.

Metametamotivation is applying metametacognition to self. The application requires your unconscious (as embodied metacognition) to rebuild itself at sea (2011-02-08 The term ‘Neurathian bootstrapping’). Applying that way of attending has more chance of focussing on the next onion layer and Chinese doll. Successful focus dissolves and dissipates the incompletion / chaff / opacity.


5 same as 4, but the more attention is applied to metacognising the noise, because the noise has become less intrusive. Resulting in noticing that more choice is available. Being able to harvest from it any useful perception applicable to other prejudiced players, and to park the balance that is of no use.

Since mindfulness does not give the underlying mechanism of how we work, it does not state how this happens. This means that even if you formulate an alternative strategy and capability to make space for choice, it is still essentially random and personal. It is not transferable.

6 same as 5, but the noise has no influence, and choices are freely made, and made on the basis of whatever the owner identifies with.

Again, if there is no discrepancy, and motivation will be limited to stroking existing wiring.

(With regard to awareness capability in mindfulness, I’ve written elsewhere the mechanism and purpose of the conscious. There is a limit easily achieved on what we can be aware of within ourselves. Mostly because most of our wiring is not ‘conscious-enabled’ and can only remain unconscious (we can never be aware of most physiology no matter how long you meditate). Partly because it is not relevant, and we can better spend the attention on triangulating what our unconscious is telling us from the small clues it leaks to the unconscious. So mindfulness is useful for obtaining maximum input, but is silent on how to use it.)


Here’s some thoughts on the origin of metacognition and metamotivation in humans, and in relation to EsSample, and their relation to the paragraph on humans unable to hear their unconscious.

These two depend on mind’s ability to hear enough of their (unconscious) modelling to hear it as doing abstraction and representation from the face value events in the external world around them. This first layer (the first Chinese doll, if you like), must have enough of a model of self to pull away from Panksepp’s primary affects.


The mind’s ability to hear enough of their unconscious to work with it depends on decoupling and conscious enablement.

Conscious enablement: Some humans have their unconscious modelling so isolated and insulated in the unconscious that that it is bottled up, and doesn’t leak or communicate with the conscious. This is the same as saying the Conscious enablement of the mind’s eye (binary adjudicator of discrepancies) varies in humans with the same distribution as IQ.

Decoupling: It is the decoupling of modelling from identity, from the blank slate internal model. Except that it is not – it is more like the internal model refining itself along the principles of EsSample’s abstractions. Either way, it is the mind’s eye as the binary adjudicator of discrepancies that is the wedge between them.

2016-02-26 I wrote that the transition from hard-wired to blank slate grew commensurate with modelling capacity, that the % hard wiring decreased from 100% to current average 50% in mammals. So rats have average 30%, bonobos average 50% and humans average 70%. Within all populations this can vary with a standard deviation of 30% of that number (e.g. ?90% humans between 40% & 100%). Much of this % is, as all modelling is, dependent on the environment replacing STM+Panksepp with Relationship with Self (RwS) & EsSample. The clearest example of this replacement is culture (Lamarkian says Prinz). This hard-wiring and replacement has a number of forms (e.g. 2015-07-19 decoupling and conscious enablement).

Metzinger describes the hard-wire binding as PSM as a 50 Hertz ‘alive’ ping from dedicated neurons. I disagree that the PMIR is ” a conscious model of the “arrow of intentionality” linking you to the world”, mainly because EsSample has everything operating unconscious, and conscious stuff is a leak from it, and has an instruction feed to the unconscious that is limited to changing the environment, and suggesting model features to be incorporated.

He himself says that you cannot be aware of the systems themselves which assemble sensory models. He corroborates that these features are mediated by a detectable the neuronal system. His ” transition from biological to cultural evolution” eauates to EsSample’s blank slate. Sadly he does not generalise and abstract out that both of these are models.